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Grantey Group

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Vissarion Sitnikov
Vissarion Sitnikov

Buy A Packer Brick !!HOT!!

Show your Packers pride, memorialize a loved one, or celebrate a special event by having your message displayed on a commemorative brick or tile to be installed at Lambeau Field. Replica products are also available for selected items and can be proudly displayed at your home or office.

buy a packer brick

"Purchasing a commemorative brick or tile is a great way for community organizations and Packers fans to celebrate special events, memorialize loved ones or simply show their Packers pride," said Packers President/CEO Bob Harlan.

The commemorative bricks will be installed in a walkway outside the north end zone of Lambeau Field, while the tiles will be placed inside the Atrium. Prices range from $75 for a 4x8-inch brick to $2,500 for a multi-brick display. Prices for tiles range from $100 to $1,250.

How would you like to leave your mark on your school? In reality you can purchase an engraved brick and have it placed in the Packer Walk for all to see. This is a good way to help your school and leave your mark.

Since the sale of commemorative bricks and tiles was announced in January, thousands of orders have come in from all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as from Canada, Germany, Japan and England.

If you want to speak to a credentialed professional who really knows about clay brick products, then consider speaking with someone who has earned a Certified Brick Specialist (CBS) certification from BIA. This designation is reserved for those individuals interested in achieving a higher level within their profession and have passed 13 in-depth technical and sales training examinations created and managed by BIA..

Deep inside the old Union Stockyards is one of America's largest providers of reclaimed brick and building materials. As old buildings are demolished in Chicago, Stockyards Brick salvages and re-sells their bricks, pavers, stone, timber, terra cotta and architectural artifacts for use in projects all over the country. Treasures from several well-known demolished buildings await new uses at this former Swift meatpacking warehouse. The interior of the warehouse, a work in progress, is also being transformed into a unique showroom and office.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic put a serious damper on purchases at brick-and-mortar stores, such as the Packers Pro Shop, but people have learned to click on that "complete your sale" button on their electronic devices.

Cattle feeders who fatten and sell cattle to meat packers allege that retail grocery chains[1] conspired to purchase beef from the packers at artificially depressed prices in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2. The feeders claim that such depressions in wholesale beef prices were reflected in the Yellow Sheet, a commercial daily beef price reporting service. They allege that the packers applied a fixed formula based on Yellow Sheet beef price quotations[2] to compute the actual prices paid for cattle and that the entire alleged depression was "passed on" to the feeders and not suffered at all by the packers[3] in a manner that functioned as an equivalent to a cost-plus contract. The pass-on was allegedly aided by the fact that cattle kept in feed lots had to be brought to market within a short period to prevent overfattening. The feeders maintain that this claimed inelastic supply of cattle provides the fixed quantity term of a cost-plus equivalency, see note 7 and accompanying text infra.

Feeders, plaintiffs, do not deal directly with the retailer defendants. Instead, they sell their cattle to packers who slaughter the cattle and convert them into beef and by-products. The packers then sell the beef (i) directly to food retailers, including defendants, or to others at the retail level (e.g., hotels, fast food chains, restaurants, and the government), and (ii) to other middlemen, such as beef jobbers, fabricators and other packers, who may process the beef further and in turn sell it to retailers. Packers do not sell by-products to the retailer defendants. A separate competitive market exists for the by-products.

600 F.2d at 1166-67. The retailers assert and the feeders conceded at oral argument that under the fifth circuit opinion, the feeders "may proceed to trial only if they now demonstrate with certainty that the packers were immune from the interactions of supply and demand and purchased cattle in a manner, functionally equivalent to a cost-plus contract, that guaranteed in every instance that the entirety of any alleged depressions in wholesale beef prices was always passed back to plaintiffs." See Defendants' Summary Judgment Memorandum at 5. In particular, the retailers maintain that the fifth circuit required that the feeders prove (recast in the procedural context *1130 of rule 56, the retailers are entitled to prevail if they show there is no genuine issue of fact but that the feeders cannot show:) (a) that the packers rigidly applied predetermined fixed formulas to the Yellow Sheet beef price quotations or the Safeway wholesale beef price in purchasing cattle; (b) that the packers applied the formulas consistently and without deviation over a long period of time; (c) that the packers had no reason to depart from their purchasing formulae in the short term because fat cattle supply is highly inelastic; (d) that the packers did not absorb depressions in beef prices; (e) that the purchase prices were set without negotiation and without regard to the interactions of supply and demand; (f) that the difference between the price actually received and the price that would have been received without formulae pricing can be shown with adequate certainty; (g) that a change in wholesale beef quotations as reported on the Yellow Sheet had a precisely calculable and predetermined effect on the actual prices paid to the feeders; that is, once the Yellow Sheet price was known for any day, the price paid for cattle was completely determined; and (h) that there is detailed proof as to individual transactions.[8]

Unlike a cost-plus contract, a variety of factors influenced the pricing decisions made by packers: individual needs, competition and negotiation for cattle, estimation of yield and grade of cattle, conditions in the cattle markets, and the fluctuation of the by-product market. See Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co., 487 F. Supp. 808, 820-21 (E.D.N.Y.1980) (no rigid formula because a number of market variables affected costs). Stated otherwise, it is beyond reasonable factual dispute that the feeders cannot show that the pricing decisions of the packers are "... determined in advance without regard to the interactions of supply and demand," 600 F.2d at 1165, or that the "... habitual use of predetermined formula would enable measurement of the effect on prices for fat cattle or changes in wholesale prices." Id.

In planning each day's cattle purchases, a packer considered his inventory and the number of cattle already purchased for delivery in the immediate future. His judgment about the adequacy of his cattle inventory directly affected the price he was willing to pay in the market. As the head buyer for IBP stated:

*1132 The packers' need to keep up kill line numbers thus affected pricing. Although the feeders' affidavits maintain that any variation in pricing occurred only on a "temporary basis," they acknowledge that there were occasions in which the packers' need to fill kill lines changed live cattle bids. See Affidavit of Brookhart at 18; Affidavit of Stallings at 18; Affidavit of Rudder at 19; Affidavit of Kirkeby at 18; and Affidavit of Sievers at 5. As one of the feeders' affidavits revealed: "[I]f ... they need cattle for their kill line, they will vary their bid up or down from the price quoted on the yellow sheet." See Affidavit of Vos at 1. Furthermore, packers generally had labor commitments that required them to pay weekly wages whether or not employees were working. The cost of labor was one of their most significant operating costs. Fixed costs inevitably and directly affected the packers' judgment about the prices they could offer for cattle and sometimes forced them to pay cattle prices that produced a loss when measured against anticipated revenues. As one packer explained in uncontradicted testimony:

The retailers have shown beyond genuine factual dispute that prices for fat cattle were, in some measure, affected by competitive bidding and individual negotiations with feeders. One packer explained:

The feeders respond that any variance between prices offered by different packers was "almost always" less than one-half cent per pound. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 18. According to the feeders, any variance between live prices on the same pen of cattle offered by different packers can be explained either by an intervening movement of the Yellow Sheet price or by differences in estimating the quality or yield characteristics of the pen by the various packer-buyers, not by any variation from the Yellow Sheet formula. The feeders' own cattle buyer affidavit explains, however, that shortages of cattle caused packer buyers to disregard Yellow Sheet prices in bidding. See Affidavit of Gilbert at 2. In times of shortage, competition increased *1133 and packers had "reason to depart from their purchasing formulae in the short run...." 600 F.2d at 1165.

Furthermore, the price of a pen of cattle often depended on negotiation between packers and feeders as to the grade and yield of the cattle in the pen. With their assertion that the Yellow Sheet price established a ceiling or maximum price a packer would offer for live cattle, the feeders recognize that negotiation occurred below the alleged ceiling. As one of feeders' buyer affidavits stated, "If at any time we could buy cattle under the Yellow Sheet we got a pat on the back." Affidavit of Snodgrass at 1. (emphasis in original).

Because most cattle were sold to packers on a "live weight" basis, packers had to estimate these factors: (a) the number of pounds of beef that would be produced from the cattle, i.e., the dressing percentage; (b) the carcass weight range of the cattle; (c) the quality grade of beef that would be produced from the cattle; and (d) the yield grade of beef that would be produced from the cattle. As one packer explained: 041b061a72


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